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Abstract 
 
Although a large body of research has been produced both on semi-presidential regimes and 
patterns of electoral change from general elections to midterm or other non-general elections,  the 
study of presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes remains, to quote one of the few 
exceptions in this regard, “uncharted territory” in the political science literature. Using a dataset 
on election results and turnout levels in all semi-presidential democracies since 1945, we test 
several hypotheses about changes in turnout levels and government parties and coalitions’ gains 
and losses in presidential elections. We show that while semi-presidential democracies with 
weaker presidencies do approximate the patterns predicted by the “second-order” model, that is 
clearly not the case where presidents hold more considerable powers, where government losses 
are explained by “negative voting” and “balancing” theories. The implications of these findings 
for the very definition of “semi-presidentialism” and the consequences of these regimes are also 
discussed. 
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Presidential Elections in Semi-Presidential Systems: Presidential 
Powers, Electoral Turnout and the Performance of Government-
Endorsed Candidates 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Political systems where presidents are popularly elected but coexist with a head of 
the executive responsible before parliament have attracted the attention of a growing 
body of literature. Although terminological and conceptual debates as to their 
distinctiveness and internal diversity have yet to be settled, all or most of such regimes 
are commonly called “semi-presidential” (Duverger, 1980), and their relevance as objects 
of study has undoubtedly increased in recent years, particularly since democratic 
transitions in Eastern Europe gave rise to an important number of them (Baylis, 1996; 
Duverger, 1997).  
Most of this literature has debated two fundamental issues. The first is the very 
definition of “semi-presidentialism”. Some have argued that the only logical and 
consequential theoretical definition is one that focuses exclusively on the regime’s 
“dispositional properties”, i.e., as systems where “a popularly-elected, fixed-term 
president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to 
parliament” (Elgie 1999: p. 13). Conversely, others have insisted in the need to take into 
account each system’s “relational properties”, i.e., the power of political actors in general 
and of the presidency in particular, leading them, in some cases, to identify sub-types of 
semi-presidential regimes  (Duverger, 1980; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Sartori, 1997; 
Roper, 2002) and, in others, to discard the category altogether (Siaroff, 2003).1 A second 
                                                 
1 Others still have tended to devalue the institutional debate in itself, defining semi-presidentialism as a 
regime that alternates between presidential and parliamentary phases (Lijphart, 1999:8). 
major issue debated in this literature concerns the implications of semi-presidentialism 
for democratic stability and accountability. One particularly acute question is whether 
and in what conditions does semi-presidentialism’s “dual democratic legitimacy” 
produces detrimental consequences, particularly in what concerns political representation 
and accountability or the likelihood of high level institutional conflict over policies 
between presidents and prime minister from opposite partisan blocs (see, for example, 
Shugart and Carey, 1992; Linz, 1994; Neto and Strøm, 2002, Schleiter and Morgan-
Jones, 2005). 
However, one particular question about semi-presidentialism has seldom been 
asked: what kind of elections are presidential elections in semi-presidential democracies? 
This is an unfortunate silence in the political science literature. First, elections that do not 
serve to determine the composition of the executive, and the kind of patterns of electoral 
change vis-à-vis general elections they exhibit, have been the object of considerable 
attention in the literature, and the theories developed to study them could conceivably be 
extended to the study of presidential elections in semi-presidential democracies. In the 
United States, for example, several theoretical approaches have been advanced in order to 
account for the losses typically experienced by the party controlling the Presidency in 
midterm congressional elections (for a review, see Erikson, 1988). And in the European 
context, the concept of “second-order” elections has been introduced to account for a 
comparable phenomenon, i.e., the tendency of large parties — particularly government 
parties — to experience losses in European Parliament elections in comparison with their 
previous performance in general legislative elections (see, among many, Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1997; Marsh, 1998; Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004; and Schmitt, 
2005). However, although it has been suggested that “elections to choose a non-executive 
head of state” should also show second-order effects (van der Eijk et al., 1996: 150; see 
also Marsh, 2000: 289), and although such effects have indeed been detected in elections 
other than those for the European Parliament (Anderson and Ward, 1996; McLean et 
al.,1996; Jeffery and Hough, 2001; and Freire, 2004), it remains to be examined whether 
presidential elections in semi-presidential democracies display similar features.  
Second, the study of presidential elections in semi-presidential democracies could 
conceivably contribute to illuminate aspects of the debates about the nature and 
consequences of the latter. The detection of similar patterns of electoral change among all 
or most semi-presidential regimes could strengthen the arguments of those that tend to 
stress this regime-type’s internal coherence and distinctiveness vis-à-vis other types of 
political system. Conversely, the discovery of systematic variations in this respect within 
semi-presidential regimes, especially if those variations are structured around institutional 
features such as presidential powers and prerogatives, could tip the scale in favour of 
those that have stressed semi-presidentialism’s internal diversity and the need to take 
each case’s “relational properties” into account. Finally, the examination of patterns and 
causes of government’s losses and gains in presidential elections speaks directly to the 
study of the  political consequences of semi-presidentialism, particularly of the factors 
favouring  partisan compatibility or cohabitation between presidents and prime-ministers 
in those regimes (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Elgie, 2001), a relevant issue when we 
consider how cohabitation may contribute to inter-institutional conflicts or affect voters’ 
ability to identify who is accountable for political outputs  
This article provides what we believe to be the first systematic cross-national 
exploration of presidential elections from 1945 to 2005 in the world’s nineteen semi-
presidential democracies. Using aggregate data on turnout and the vote shares obtained 
by government parties and government-endorsed candidates in both legislative and 
presidential elections, this article examines patterns and causes of two different variables 
that have been recurrently studied in research focusing on non-general election results: 
differences in turnout levels between legislative and presidential elections; and the extent 
to which national government parties are likely to experience electoral losses in 
presidential elections. 
 
2. (Semi-)presidential elections as low-salience elections 
 
Of the several theoretical approaches that have been used to explain changes from 
general to non-general elections, two of them make somewhat similar assumptions about 
the comparatively lower importance of the latter for voters and its implications. One is 
the “surge and decline” hypothesis (Campbell, 1960). Originally developed to account for 
the recurrent losses experienced by the American President’s party in Congressional 
midterm elections, it suggests that what makes these elections different is the intensity 
and character of the political stimulation they provide. Where choices have less important 
political consequences, as in the case of midterm elections, the stimulation to vote will be 
lower. However, lower turnout is not the only thing we should expect from such “low-
stimulus” elections. On the one hand, many of the voters who tend to be absent in those 
elections are the “peripheral” and non-usual voters who, in the previous high-stimulus 
election, has been swayed towards the party that was most advantaged by short-term 
political circumstances. On the other hand, the “core” voters whose sense of the 
heightened importance of high-stimulus elections may have also led them to support the 
advantaged party will, in midterm elections, tend to return to their “usual voting position” 
(Campbell, 1960: 401). Thus, from both points of view, a surge for the government party 
in general elections is likely to be followed by a decline in midterm, non-general 
elections. 
The “second-order model”, developed to account for the recurrent losses of both 
large and government parties in European Parliament elections, also suggests that 
elections can be distinguished on the basis of how important voters perceive them to be 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980). “First-order” elections are those whose outcome is directly 
consequential for the distribution of political offices at the national level and for the 
control of the apparatus of government, and are thus more likely to be salient at the eyes 
of voters. By comparison, since less is perceived to be at stake in “second-order” 
elections, citizens are less likely to vote in them. Moreover, since the incentives to vote 
strategically for the formation of a government tend to be absent in the case of second-
order elections, voters are more likely to express their support for the party that is closer 
to their preferences rather than for one of the larger parties. Finally, the supporters of 
governing parties, knowing that their vote in these elections are devoid of direct 
consequences in terms of a change in the partisan composition of the cabinet, are also 
likely to feel freer to use their vote to express dissatisfaction with government 
performance. Thus, second-order elections should display losses for larger parties in 
comparison with the preceding first-order elections, especially when those parties are in 
government and when elections take place at the lowest point of government popularity 
in the electoral cycle, around the midterm.  
 
2.1 Electoral turnout 
If presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes are conceived as “low 
stimulus” or “low salience” elections, the first prediction that derives from that 
assumption is that turnout levels in those elections should be lower than in legislative 
elections. The first step in testing this hypothesis in our cases consists in identifying the 
whole range of cases of semi-presidential democracies. In a recent and exhaustive survey 
of comparative presidential institutions, Siaroff identifies the thirty-four historical and 
contemporary cases of such systems where there is “a popularly elected head of state and 
a separate head of government (prime minister), with the latter accountable to the 
legislature” (Siaroff, 2003: 299-300). There is, however, a second necessary step: 
restricting the analysis to those countries and periods where a democratic regime was 
indeed in place. For that purpose, we used Freedom House ratings, which distinguish 
between “free electoral democracies” and the remaining kinds of semi-democratic, 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.2  
Under these criteria, twelve semi-presidential systems listed by Siaroff fail to 
qualify as “free electoral democracies” at any moment in the period under consideration 
(1945-2005): Armenia, Belarus, Central African Republic, Comoros, Georgia, Guinea-
Bissau, Macedonia, Madagascar, Moldova, Mozambique, Russia, and Ukraine. They are 
                                                 
2 See Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country ratings, 1972-2005 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm). 
thus excluded from our analysis.3 Furthermore, not all elections within the period 1945-
2005 in the remaining countries can be included, since several of them were held in 
periods when those countries did not qualify as “free electoral democracies”. Once these 
criteria are applied, we are left with the cases and periods listed in table 1. The first 
column lists the nineteen relevant countries, followed, in parenthesis, by the periods 
during which their constitutions allowed both for the direct election of the head of state 
and for a separate head of the executive accountable before parliament. The second and 
fourth columns then list the dates for the first and last presidential and legislative 
elections that took place within the period 1945-2005 while these countries were both 
semi-presidential and rated as “free electoral democracies”, showing, in parenthesis, the 
number of elections of each type that fall within the relevant periods.4 Finally, columns 
three and five show the average turnout for each type of election for those periods.5  
                                                 
3 Siaroff’s list of semi-presidential countries does not include cases that other authors have defined as 
“semi-presidential” (Elgie 1999), such as Azerbaijan, Benin, Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,  Lebanon, Namibia, Niger, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and 
Uzbekistan. However, some of these cases are clearly not semi-presidential regimes: either because 
executive power is constitutionally and explicitly vested upon the President or because the Prime Minister 
and the cabinet are not responsible before the legislature, Azerbaijan, Benin, the Dominican Republic, 
Ghana, Guyana, Namibia, South Korea, or Togo cannot be described as semi-presidential. Lebanon lacks 
presidential elections altogether. Other cases can be excluded for not qualifying as free electoral 
democracies in the period under consideration, or for not having held presidential elections as free electoral 
democracies in that period: Gabon, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Niger, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan. 
Finally, for reasons related to the lack of access to the relevant data, we also dropped out of the analysis the 
pre-1945 historical cases (Uruguay 1919-1933, Germany 1919-1933, and Spain 1931-1936), as well as 
Burkina Faso during the two years (1978 and 1979) when it was rated as a free electoral democracy. 
4 We coded Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, and Ireland as “free electoral democracies” in the entire 
period after 1945 under which they had semi-presidential systems. Conversely, although, by 1997, Mali 
qualified as a “free electoral democracy” on the Freedom House ratings, we decided to exclude the 1997 
If presidential elections in all semi-presidential democracies were to fit the 
assumptions of the “surge and decline” or “second-order approaches”, we should observe 
systematically lower levels of turnout in presidential elections in comparison with 
legislative elections in these systems. However, cursory inspection of table 1 already 
shows that the relationship between turnout in legislative and presidential elections varies 
sharply across countries. To take just the more extreme examples, while turnout in 
Ireland was, on average, about 16 per cent lower in presidential elections than in 
legislative elections, turnout in presidential elections was, on average, 13 per cent higher 
than in legislative elections in a country like Poland. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 shows the difference, for each country, between the average turnout 
levels in presidential and legislative elections. Thus, to the left of the graph, we find the 
semi-presidential democracies where turnout in presidential elections tends to conform to 
the predictions of surge-and-decline or second-order approaches: Ireland, Croatia, Cape 
                                                                                                                                                 
elections from our analysis. Legislative elections, in particular, were affected by opposition boycotts and 
suspicions of irregularities, which were not entirely dispelled even after the Constitutional Court ordered 
their repetition in July and August: see Carter Center (2002). For different reasons, the March 1991 
presidential elections in São Tomé and Príncipe and the 1996 presidential elections in Cape Verde were 
also excluded: although the countries qualified as a “free electoral democracies” in those years, the 
presidential elections were not competitive: in São Tomé, Miguel Trovoada was the sole candidate in the 
election after the other two remaining candidates withdrew in February, while in Cape Verde, António 
Mascarenhas Monteiro was also the unchallenged candidate.  
5 Turnout data for each election obtained from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) Voter Turnout database (http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm). 
Verde, Slovakia, Iceland, Bulgaria, Portugal, and Mongolia. However, there is an 
important number of semi-presidential systems where the exact opposite happens: 
Poland, Mali, Taiwan, São Tomé and Príncipe, France, Peru, and Lithuania. Finally, there 
is a smaller group of countries where the average turnout in the two types of elections is 
almost identical, with average differences below three percentage points: Finland, 
Austria, Slovenia, and Romania. In any case, the findings are discrepant with the notion 
that presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes can be generically treated as “low-
salience” or “low-stimulus” elections from this point of view: in no less than eleven of 
our nineteen countries, average turnout in presidential elections is almost identical or 
even higher than in legislative elections. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
What may account for this variation between semi-presidential democracies? 
Looking at similarly puzzling results from a more reduced set of presidential elections in 
non-presidential regimes, Blais suggests that the difference between turnout in 
presidential and legislative elections is unlikely to be determined by the “‘objective’ 
importance of the [presidential] election”, and that the potentially lower levels of 
mobilization around the election of a president lacking in significant political powers may 
be counteracted by its more personalized nature, making it more appealing to both voters 
and the media (Blais, 2000: 40). The fact that, among so many of these semi-presidential 
democracies, average turnout in presidential elections is close to or even above that of 
legislative elections lends some preliminary credence to this argument.  
However, we should not exclude the hypothesis that differences between turnout 
levels in presidential and legislative elections are indeed structured by the powers 
constitutionally bestowed on the presidency before testing it systematically. The first step 
in doing so consists in obtaining measures of presidential powers. We will rely here on 
what is perhaps one of the simplest and surely the most exhaustive in terms of country 
coverage, the one provided by Siaroff, which distinguishes between seven different 
presidential powers:  
the ability of the president to chair formal cabinet meetings and thus engage in 
agenda setting (…), the power to veto legislation (…), whether the president has 
broad emergency or decree powers for national disorder and/or economic matters 
which are effectively valid for an unlimited time (…), whether the president has a 
central role in foreign policy (…), the discretionary appointment (…) of some key 
individuals such as the prime minister, other cabinet ministers, high court judges, 
senior military figures and/or central bankers (…), the ability to select, remove, 
and/or keep from office a given individual as prime minister, and/or a given party 
as part of the cabinet (…) and the ability (…) to dissolve the legislature at will, at 
most subject to only temporal restrictions (Siaroff 2003: 304-305). 
 
 Table 2 shows the powers of the presidency in all nineteen semi-presidential 
democracies considered thus far, coding the presence (1) or absence (0) of each power 
and computing a simple additive index for each country (Presidential Powers Index), 
which was used to sort cases from the most to the least powerful presidencies. Since 
Finland, Poland, and Portugal experienced constitutional amendments throughout this 
period with direct impact on the powers of the presidency, separate indexes were 
computed for the periods during which different constitutional rules touching on 
presidential powers prevailed, leading to a total of 24 measures of presidential powers for 
our 19 countries. 
  
Table 2 about here 
 
We can now assess the plausibility of the hypothesis that differences in turnout 
between presidential and legislative elections are related to presidential powers. Taking 
countries as our unit of analysis, the correlation of the Presidential Powers Index with the 
average difference between presidential and legislative elections’ turnout for each 
country is .41, of moderate strength but nevertheless statistically significant at p<.05 with 
just 23 cases.6 In other words, more powers bestowed on the presidency seem to be 
related with higher turnout in presidential elections in comparison with legislative 
elections.  
We can examine this relationship more systematically by shifting our unit of 
analysis from the level of the country to each concrete presidential election, while 
introducing several crucial control variables. In the following analysis, our dependent 
variable is the difference between turnout in each presidential election and the preceding 
legislative election (Turnout Change). In our nineteen countries, 74 instances of 
presidential elections − preceded by legislative elections, taking place between 1945 and 
                                                 
6 Post-2000 Finland is excluded for lack of observations concerning turnout in presidential elections up to 
2005. 
2005, and under a semi-presidential “free electoral democracy” − can be identified.7 The 
Presidential Powers Index, measured at the time of each presidential election, is our 
crucial independent variable: we expect that, to the extent that variations in presidential 
power are politically consequential and perceived by voters, more powers for the 
president should result in greater salience of the elections held to elect him or her and 
greater mobilization efforts by parties and candidates, leading thus to greater turnout 
levels in comparison with legislative elections.  
The effect of presidential powers in turnout change is estimated while controlling 
for the effects of three additional factors. The first is whether there was an incumbent 
running for re-election (1) or not (0) in the presidential election in question (Incumbent 
Running). Incumbency gives candidates an inbuilt advantage in terms of public 
recognition and the political and organizational resources they can put in place to seek re-
election. As Jones shows, looking at a large sample of presidential elections in both 
presidential and semi-presidential systems since 1940, presidential incumbents running 
for re-election won in four out of every five elections (Jones, 2004: 80). This suggests 
that the presence of an incumbent is likely to decrease the competitiveness of presidential 
elections, thus decreasing turnout.8 We therefore expect this variable to have a negative 
                                                 
7 Since the logic of the analysis lies in the comparison between presidential elections’ turnout and that of 
immediately preceding legislative elections, we excluded all presidential elections that were not preceded 
by any legislative election in the period during which the country had a democratic semi-presidential 
regime. Cases where a presidential election was preceded by another presidential election (rather than a 
legislative election) were also excluded. When concurrent presidential and legislative elections were held, 
turnout in the former was compared with turnout in the latter, although table 3 also shows computations 
excluding those cases. 
8 In fact, it is likely that the negative effect of a running incumbent on our dependent variable will always 
be underestimated, since countries like Iceland or Ireland have constitutional provisions that have allowed 
effect on the dependent variable: when sitting presidents are running for re-election, the 
turnout of presidential elections when compared with that of the immediately preceding 
legislative elections should be lower. 
The second control variable is the number of years — the number of days divided 
by 365 — between the date of the presidential election and the date of the immediately 
preceding legislative election (Years since Legislative Election).Turnout in any election 
seems to increase the furthest away the most recent previous election it has taken place 
(Franklin, 2002: 159). We therefore expect this variable to produce a positive effect: the 
more time has passed between the presidential and the preceding legislative election, the 
greater the turnout in the former is likely to be in comparison with the latter. Finally, we 
add Turnout in the Preceding Legislative Election as a control variable. Since differences 
among countries and elections in terms of turnout can be caused by a large number of 
systemic and contextual factors, we add this variable to the model in order to be able to 
estimate the effects of our relevant explanatory variable on a stable base of electoral 
participation in legislative elections. Table 3 shows the results of the test of these 
hypotheses both using the entire sample and in the sub-sample of cases where legislative 
and presidential elections were not concurrent.9  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
them to routinely waive presidential elections when a candidate — normally the incumbent — is 
unchallenged and where, conceivably, any election that would up taking place would certainly be lacking in 
competitiveness and, thus, salience for voters. 
9 Cases of concurrent legislative and presidential elections in our sample include Romania (1996, 2000, and 
2004), Peru (1980 and 1985), Slovenia in 1992, and Taiwan in 1996. Since concurrent elections are likely 
to neutralize differences in any direction between turnout in legislative and presidential elections, we 
expect the model’s fit to improve in the set of countries were legislative and presidential elections were 
held at different points in time. 
Table 3 about here 
 
 As we can see in table 3, the coefficients for the variables Incumbent Running, 
Turnout in the Preceding Legislative Election, and Years since Legislative Election all 
have the predicted signs: negative for the first two, and positive for the third. None of 
them reach, however, statistical significance at the conventional levels. But the central 
finding concerns the impact of presidential powers in the difference in turnout between 
presidential and legislative elections: keeping other things equal, the more powers to the 
presidency, the larger turnout in presidential elections tends to be in comparison to 
legislative elections. The models’ explained variance is slightly higher when applied to 
the cases without concurrent elections. 
Thus, in several countries, levels of turnout in presidential elections are higher 
than what the lack of proper executive powers of such presidents might suggest. And 
from the point of view of turnout levels, not all semi-presidential democracies seem to 
conform to the expectation that they should be “low salience” or “low stimulus” 
elections. However, those that do also tend to be the ones that that take place in semi-
presidential systems where elected presidents enjoy less powers. In other words, 
presidential powers do account for levels of turnout, and as we saw from the initial 
correlational analysis made at the level of countries, these results are not likely to be a 
function of the particular composition of the sample in terms of the number of elections 
considered per country. The question that follows, then, is whether presidential powers 
are also consequential to the extent to which presidential elections conform to another 
prediction of “surge and decline” and “second-order theories”: the existence of 
systematic government losses.  
 
2.2 Government gains and losses: measurement issues 
Like legislative elections, European Parliament elections are fought by parties 
seeking to gain seats in a legislative chamber. But unlike legislative elections, 
presidential elections in semi-presidential democracies are fought by candidates who seek 
to occupy an individual office. It is true that most of these candidates tend to receive the 
explicit endorsement of political parties. However, there are cases where a one-to-one 
match between each political party competing on national legislative elections and each 
presidential candidate is absent. Since the objective here is to compare government 
parties’ shares of the vote in legislative elections with government candidates’ shares of 
the vote in presidential elections, this creates particular measurement problems that need 
to be addressed from the outset. 
 In some cases, measuring “government’s share of the vote” in both legislative 
and presidential elections turns out to be relatively simple. For example, in the April 1971 
Austrian presidential elections, the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), by then the sole party 
supporting the government, endorsed the re-election bid of Franz Jonas. His share of the 
vote, 52.8 percent — against Kurt Waldheim”s 47.2 percent − can be easily compared 
with SPÖ’s share of the vote in the preceding March 1970 legislative elections (48.1 
percent). Things become slightly more complex in cases where two or more parties 
forming a governmental coalition support one or more presidential candidates. Thus, for 
example — and to stick with the Austrian example — the May 1986 presidential 
elections saw the SPÖ and the FPÖ (the Austrian Freedom Party), which by then still 
formed a government coalition, supporting two different candidates, respectively, Kurt 
Steyrer and Otto Scrinzi. Nevertheless, in order to determine whether the candidates 
endorsed by government parties in a particular presidential election tend to be punished 
in comparison to the scores obtained by those parties in the preceding legislative election, 
we can compare the combined share of the vote obtained by Steyrer and Scrinzi (44.9 
percent) with the combined scores of SPÖ and FPÖ in the April 1983 legislative elections 
(47.6 percent). 
There are, however, situations in which the very concept of “government 
candidates” is put into question by the fact that parties in both government and the 
opposition support the same candidates. We can illustrate the problem with the help of 
the Portuguese case. In the 1991 presidential elections, the centre-right Social Democratic 
Party (PSD), by then controlling a single-party majority in parliament, endorsed the re-
election of the incumbent, Mário Soares. However, it was joined in that endorsement by 
the opposition’s centre-left Socialist Party (PS). In this case, the direct comparison 
between the share of vote obtained in the preceding legislative election by the parties in 
government (50.2 percent, in the 1987 elections) and that obtained in the 1991 
presidential election by the “government-endorsed candidate” (70.4 percent) makes little 
sense, since, in that case, we would not be taking into account the fact that PS was also 
endorsing the government’s candidate. 
In order to solve this potential measurement problem while preserving the ability 
to validly compare election results in all these varied situations, the following general 
rule was adopted: we compare the shares of the valid vote obtained by all candidates 
endorsed by government parties in each presidential election with the shares of the valid 
vote obtained in the previous legislative election by all parties that endorsed those 
candidates.10 Thus, going back to the Portuguese 1991 example, Soares was the only 
presidential candidate endorsed by a party in government (the PSD), obtaining, as we saw 
previously, 70.4 percent of the vote. However, since he was endorsed by two parties, one 
in government and another in the opposition (PS), we must compare the share of the vote 
Soares obtained in 1991 with the share of the vote obtained in 1987 by the two parties 
that endorsed him, i.e., the PSD and the PS (74.1 percent).    
The level of government gains in presidential elections, our dependent variable, is 
assessed by calculating the difference between the valid vote obtained by government-
endorsed candidates and the valid vote obtained by all parties that supported them in the 
preceding legislative election (Government Gain). We obtained information about which 
candidates were supported by government parties (and the remaining parties that 
endorsed them) from Keesing’s Record of World Events,11 while the necessary electoral 
scores were obtained from a variety of sources for all but one of our cases.12 However, 
since we are testing whether presidential elections are used to punish government parties, 
we only included in our sample elections where any of parties in government endorsed 
                                                 
10 In two-round legislative or presidential elections, first-round vote shares were used. 
11 For the cases of Austria, Finland, and Iceland, such information was complemented with other sources: 
Müller (1999), Paloheimo (2001) and Kristinsson (1999). 
12 The main sources for electoral results were Mackie and Rose (1991 and 1997). Additional sources and 
crosschecking of data were obtained from the African Elections Database 
(http://africanelections.tripod.com/), the International Foundation for Election Systems’ Election Guide 
database (http://www.electionguide.org/), the Political Database of the Americas 
(http://www.georgetown.edu/pdb), the election results’ database of the Project on Political Transformation 
and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/election.asp) 
and Parties and Elections in Europe database (http://www.parties-and-elections.de/).  Ultimately, only for 
the Mongolian 2000 legislative elections did we fail to obtain the share of the vote obtained by the different 
parties.  
any presidential candidate, which led to the exclusion of yet another case.13 And for the 
same reason, vote shares in each presidential election are always compared with those in 
the preceding legislative election, i.e., the election on the basis of which the incumbent 
government at the time of the presidential election was formed. We were left therefore 
with 68 presidential elections (in semi-presidential democratic systems, preceded by 
legislative elections, and where government parties endorsed at least a candidate).  
  
2.3 Government gains and losses: hypotheses and results 
The main prediction that derived from assuming lower salience for presidential 
elections in semi-presidential democracies is that the parties in government should — 
through the presidential candidates they support — experience electoral losses in relation 
to the score they obtained in the preceding legislative elections. However, the second-
order model makes specific predictions about the relationship between the timing of 
elections and the size of those losses. Since one of their major source is the expression of 
discontent on the part of voters, such losses are unlikely to occur indiscriminately through 
time. Instead, their magnitude (and whether they take place at all) should depend upon 
the popularity of governments, which, in turn, seems to follow a cyclical pattern: highest 
immediately after the elections, lowest at midterm, and recovering again towards the end 
of the cycle. This is, in fact, what most of the abundant literature on European elections 
has generally found: that the magnitude of government losses in relation to the preceding 
legislative elections tends to follow a curvilinear pattern (Marsh, 1998; Ferrara and 
Weishaupt, 2004; Schmitt, 2005).  
                                                 
13 This was the case in the 2003 presidential elections in Iceland. 
Whether a second-order cyclical pattern of government losses in presidential 
elections is indeed present is also likely to be contingent upon at least two systemic 
factors. First, the actual powers bestowed on the presidency. The notion that sincere 
supporters of government parties feel free to use those elections in order to send a 
message of dissatisfaction rests on the assumption that they perceive little real political 
power to be at stake in the presidential office. However, as we saw in the previous 
section, that assumption may be untenable in several semi-presidential regimes, 
especially those where greater powers are indeed bestowed on the presidency and where 
presidential elections seem to be no less salient and mobilizing than legislative elections. 
Therefore, we should expect a cyclical pattern of government losses to be visible in those 
semi-presidential regimes with weaker presidents, but not necessarily in those whose 
presidents have at least some amount of influence in policy-making, agenda-setting, or 
cabinet composition and survival.  
Second, cyclical patterns of government losses may also be contingent upon the 
level of party system institutionalization in each country. In a recent analysis of the 2004 
European Parliament election results, Schmitt attributes the absence of such patterns in 
the new post-communist EU countries (in contrast with the remaining cases) to the 
instability of their party systems and the lack of stable party alignments among voters. 
The result is that changes in aggregate electoral results from one election to the other, 
rather than stemming mainly from vote switches predictable on the basis of the second-
order model, are also the result of volatile voters’ preferences in relation to an unstable 
supply of party choices (Schmitt, 2005: 666-668). Similarly, Mainwaring has shown that 
unstable party organizations and labels as well as citizens’ weak attachments to existing 
parties tend to be associated with high levels of electoral instability and unpredictability, 
besides allowing the successful emergence of apartisan presidential candidates, using 
personalistic (and sometimes populist) appeals (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; 
Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). In sum, the notion that certain parties 
might be systematically punished or rewarded in less salient elections on the basis of their 
size and government status assumes that the available options in each election are 
inherently connected by similar and stable party labels and by the transposition to 
second-order elections of first-order platforms and positions. Thus, we hypothesize that 
second-order patterns are less likely to emerge in democracies with lower levels of party 
system institutionalization. As Mainwaring and Torcal suggest, the crucial distinction in 
this respect is likely to be the one between earlier “early” (“first” and “second wave”) and 
“late democratizers” (“third wave” democracies), a function of the latter’s particular 
historical and socio-political developmental sequence, such as creation of new 
democratic party systems after the emergence of modern mass media, particularly 
television, as the main channels of political intermediation, or the less central role of 
parties in the expansion of citizenship (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005: 209).  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 2 presents the average government gains from legislative to presidential 
elections per country, first for the early democratizers (first and second wave 
democracies) and then for the late democratizers (third wave democracies), with the 
number of presidential elections considered in each country in parenthesis.14 One can 
immediately see that although government losses — in terms of vote share for 
government-endorsed presidential candidates in comparison with that obtained in the 
preceding legislative elections by the parties that endorsed them — seem to be the norm 
for a majority of countries, this is much more the case for third wave democracies rather 
than for early democratizers, quite unlike we had hypothesized.  
It could be the case, nonetheless, that such unexpected contrast is actually 
obscuring fundamental variations between countries and concrete elections according to 
the levels of presidential powers or the timing of elections in relation to the first-order 
cycle. This hypothesis is tested in table 4, which shows the results of the regression of 
government gains in presidential elections on a series of variables. First, following 
Anderson and Ward (1996) in their study of “barometer elections”, we include in the 
model a measure of government performance in the previous election: Government 
Parties’ Vote in Legislative Elections. This is the absolute share of the vote obtained in 
legislative elections by the parties endorsing the government’s presidential candidates. 
Although Anderson and Ward advance a similar variable in order to test the “surge and 
decline” hypothesis (1996), it should probably be more appropriately seen as a test of a 
more generic “regression to the mean” hypothesis (Campbell, 1985; Oppenheimer et al., 
1986): the larger the share of the vote obtained by a party or a coalition in a given 
election, the more likely it becomes that it experiences losses in relation to the previous 
score in a subsequent election. We thus expect a negative sign for the coefficient 
associated with this variable.  
                                                 
14 ‘Third wave’ democracies in our sample are Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Croatia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Peru, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Slovakia, Slovenia and Taiwan.  
Conversely, we test the “surge and decline” hypothesis by adding Turnout 
Change to the model. To the extent government losses result, in part, from the 
demobilization of “peripheral voters” who previously voted for the advantaged party, we 
should find that government losses should be larger as drops in turnout from legislative to 
presidential elections increase. In other words, on the basis of the surge and decline 
approach, we expect Turnout Change (both from legislative to presidential elections) to 
have positive impact on Government Gains, particularly in the cases of weaker 
presidencies (where, as we have seen, the “low-stimulus” assumption is more tenable). 
The presence of the cyclical pattern of government losses predicted by the 
second-order model is then assessed by evaluating whether the relative performance of 
government parties in presidential elections results from a quadratic function of the 
proportion of the legislative term elapsed since first-order elections. Thus, we add the 
variables Cycle and Cycle2 to the model, with Cycle measured as the proportion of the 
legislative term elapsed at the time the presidential election took place, ranging, in our 
sample, from .1 to 1, measured always in relation to the latest constitutionally prescribed 
possible election date after each legislative election.  
Finally, since we expect that cyclical pattern of government losses to be present 
only in semi-presidential regimes with weak presidents, we test our model both for the 
entire sample and for two sub-samples of cases, those in the bottom- and in the upper-
halves of our 8-point Presidential Powers Index. And taking into account the possibility 
of different patterns in early and late democratizers, we also ran an alternative 
specification of the model, using interaction terms for Cycle and Cycle2 with dummies for 
“First and Second Wave” and “Third Wave” democracies.  
 Table 4 about here 
 
As table 4 shows, Government Parties’ Vote in Legislative Elections has the 
predicted negative sign in all models, reaching statistical significance in the model 
including interaction terms as applied to the full sample. Conversely, there is no evidence 
of a “surge and decline” effect, as Turnout Change is far from statistical significance in 
all models. However, two additional things are revealed by the results in Table 4. First, 
the inadequacy of the model specification that does not take into account how cycle 
effects may vary according to whether regimes are early or late democratizers: in either 
the full sample or any of the sub-samples, the models lacking the interaction terms 
always provide a worse fit to the data. Second, that the only case where the cycle 
variables are significant and have the predicted signs is, as hypothesized, that applied to 
the subset of semi-presidential regimes with weaker presidents.  
However, contrary to initial expectations (but along the line of what figure 2 
already suggested), it is the interaction terms with the Third Wave dummy (rather than 
with First and Second Waves) that emerge as statistically significant. Third wave 
democracies display pattern of government candidates’ performances gradually 
worsening in comparison with the legislative elections’ score obtained by the parties that 
endorsed them, only to recover (after the lowest point at about .6 of the cycle) up to the 
end of term. For example, when the variables measuring government parties’ electoral 
performance in the legislative election and turnout change are set at the sub-sample’s 
mean value and Third Wave is set at 1 (and First and Second Waves, obviously, at 0), we 
observe, early in the cycle (.10), a predicted gain for government-endorsed presidential 
candidates of just -3.5 percentage points, meaning that government-endorsed candidates 
experience a loss of 3.5 points in relation to the share of the vote obtained, in the 
preceding legislative election, by the parties that endorsed them. However, this loss 
increases to 18.7 points at about the midterm, only to decrease again to a loss of 7 points 
at the very end of the legislative election cycle (Cycle at 1). In contrast, the interaction 
terms with First and Second Wave remain far from statistical significance in all models 
and sub-sets of cases.  
How to interpret these findings? On the one hand, support for the notion that the 
relative performance of government-endorsed candidates in any set of countries conforms 
to the expectations of second-order theories is less than overwhelming. Although cyclical 
effects are found among the set of semi-presidential regimes with weaker presidents (as 
expected), they are, more unexpectedly, found among late (rather than early) 
democratizers, and the overall fit of the model is poor. Besides, it could be argued that 
our measurement of the relative performance of government-endorsed candidates might 
tend to underestimate government losses and thus obscure cyclical effects, since our 
sample of presidential elections contains several cases where government-endorsed 
presidential candidates were also endorsed by opposition parties, something that, from 
the point of view the second-order theories, would potentially mitigate the extent to 
which voters are able and willing to punish government parties in presidential elections.15 
                                                 
15 Among our sample of presidential elections, there are 12 of such cases: Austria in the 1980 and 1998 
presidential elections, Finland in 1968 and 1978, France in 1969 and 1974, Iceland in 1988, Portugal in 
1976, 1986 and 1996,  and Romania in 2000. 
However, we reran the analyses excluding such cases from the sample and all sub-
samples and found no improvements on the fit of any of the models. 
On the other hand, however, there are several reasons why we should not be 
extremely surprised by these results. In one of the rare existing studies of presidential 
elections in an established semi-presidential democracy using individual-level data — the 
Irish 1997 elections — van der Brug and his colleagues also found that the largely 
symbolic nature of the presidential office and the predictable spill-over of themes and 
cues from the first-order arena were not enough to guarantee strong links between 
candidate and party preferences in presidential elections. Ultimately, “neither power, nor 
sending a message to the first-order arena seems to have been at stake” (van der Brug et 
al. 2000: p. 648). Instead, in the Irish presidential elections, voters seem to have used 
cues other than party identification or the relationship of candidates with government 
parties for their voting decisions, turning these elections into “popularity contest in which 
voters express what kind of person they want as they head of state” and where “voters’ 
preferences for presidential candidates (…) [are] largely unconnected to their political 
opinions” (van der Brug et al., 2000: p 635).  
The cases of Austria and Iceland — the other established semi-presidential 
democracies with presidential powers in the bottom-half of our scale — also seem to 
follow a similar pattern, through which the partisan links of presidential candidates are of 
limited and, perhaps, declining importance. As Müller notes, “the personalities of the 
candidates have always been important and since the 1970s the relevance of this factor 
has considerably increased”, as parties tend to endorse “elder statesman” (rather than 
party leaders) and the candidates make a conscious effort to display partisan neutrality 
both during the campaign and, when victorious, while in office (Müller, 1999: 42-44). 
Similarly, in Iceland, although candidates’ partisan provenance is, in most cases, 
identifiable, “the president is a political outsider in the sense that he is chosen on personal 
rather than on political grounds”, to the point where parties themselves have actually 
abdicated, since 1952, from making formal endorsements to candidates (Kristinsson, 
1999: 100). Thus, from this point of view, the absence of second-order cyclical patterns 
of government punishment in the Irish, Austrian or Icelandic cases might come as less of 
a surprise. 
Conversely, one of the interesting features characterizing most of the “third wave” 
semi-presidential democracies has been the fact that, even when the powers bestowed on 
the presidency are relatively scarce — like in most of the Eastern European cases and 
post-1982 Portugal — this has not prevented the high public and political prominence of 
the relationship between the presidential candidates, the presidential office, and the 
existing party system. Voters in these countries have certainly not lacked informational 
shortcuts allowing them to connect presidential races with party politics, especially 
considering that candidates have often performed previous roles as high-level party 
officials, members or speakers of parliament and, in large number of cases, as party 
leaders or even prime ministers. Purvanov in Bulgaria, Mesic in Croatia, Paksas in 
Lithuania, Kwasniewski in Poland, Sampaio and Soares in Portugal, Iliescu, 
Constantinescu, and Basescu in Romania, Schuster and Gasparovic in Slovakia, and 
Drnovsek in Slovenia are just some of the most prominent of these cases. Besides, third-
wave semi-presidential democracies have also been characterized by frequent periods of 
cohabitation, with conflicts between the presidency and the executive over a variety of 
policy and institutional issues becoming a central part of the political agenda (Frain, 
1995; Baylis, 1996; Protsyk, 2005). Therefore, in these countries, lower levels of party 
system institutionalization may have been compensated by greater levels of public 
visibility and partisan engagement in presidential elections fought along the familiar lines 
of first-order elections, allowing voters to use clearer partisan cues in their presidential 
voting decisions, justifying the apparently surprising fact that, after all, it is only among 
third-wave democracies that we are able to find the most persuasive evident of a cyclical 
pattern of government losses. We will return to this issue in the final section of the 
article. 
 
3. Alternative approaches to government’s electoral performance in presidential 
elections 
 
As we have just seen, the notions that the election of a non-executive head of state 
should result in losses for government, and that such losses should be higher at midterm, 
receives only qualified support from the available data, limited, as predicted, to regimes 
with weaker presidents and, more unexpectedly, to third-wave democracies. However, at 
least from the point of view of the value of the vote for the electorate and its reflection on 
aggregate turnout, there are several semi-presidential democracies where the fundamental 
assumptions of the either the “surge and decline” or “second-order” approaches seem 
now less tenable. In fact, it would be surprising if citizens perceived the selection of 
presidents as a minor affair in countries where those presidents enjoy some discretion in 
dismissing governments or even calling new elections, and may even share responsibility 
with the executive in some domains of policy-making, such as foreign policy. And in 
those cases, as we have seen, there is little evidence of the lower turnout levels or the 
kind of government losses hypothesized by the theories that assume presidential elections 
to have lower salience for voters. Therefore, we must turn our attention to explanations of 
the different performance of government parties in legislative and presidential elections 
where the assumption of lower salience does not play a crucial role.  
As Marsh (2000) recalls, most of theories that have tried to account for electoral 
changes across different types of elections — including second-order theories themselves 
— have their roots in the observation of electoral patterns in US midterm elections, and 
there is no reason why we should not contemplate their further applicability to the 
explanation of a comparable phenomenon. One of the major theoretical approaches to 
changes in the electoral performance of the presidential party in midterm Congressional 
elections is that the latter can be simply conceived of as referenda on the performance of 
government, whose perception by the voters can be ascertained on the basis of popularity 
data and, indirectly, economic indicators (Tufte, 1975; 1978). This notion has several 
points of contact with the second-order model, but contrary to it, makes no assumptions 
about the lack of salience of non-general elections, voters’ willingness to take advantage 
of them to punish incumbents, any systematic tendency towards government losses, or 
even about the midterm being the particular point in the electoral cycle where losses are 
greater. Instead, if losses do tend be greater at midterm, it is just assumed that occurs just 
because the executive’s popularity does seem to decline throughout the term in office and 
the economy to improve at the time of general elections. However, as Marsh notes, “to 
the extent that neither is the case, the president’s party should not suffer midterm losses” 
(Marsh, 2000).  
There is already a relevant body research suggesting that presidential election 
results in semi-presidential democracies may be affected by economic factors. Most of 
that research, however, has been made in (or has been theoretically inspired by) the 
French case. Under unified government — when the French President and Prime Minister 
belong to the same party coalition — the score obtained by presidential officeholders (or 
candidates endorsed by the government’s party) seems to be largely explained by GDP 
growth (Lewis-Beck, 1997; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). Conversely, under 
cohabitation — when the President and the Prime Minister belong to different party 
coalitions — economic liabilities or assets accrue to the presidential candidates endorsed 
by the parties controlling the assembly and the cabinet (Lewis-Beck, 1997; Lewis-Beck 
and Nadeau, 2000).16 However, the common feature of both the “unified government” 
and “cohabitation” situations is that the candidates endorsed by the party coalition 
controlling the assembly and supporting the executive — the President or the president’s 
party candidates, under unified government, or the candidates endorsed by the 
government, under cohabitation — are held accountable for economic performance. 
Thus, since our dependent variable measures change in the performance of the party or 
parties controlling the government from legislative to presidential elections — 
Government Gain — we expect greater economic growth to result generally in greater 
gains for the government in presidential elections (through the presidential candidates 
                                                 
16 In an unpublished paper, Samuels and Hellwig (2004) extend this argument to all semi-presidential 
regimes, where, according to their analysis, the incumbent president (or the candidate endorsed by 
incumbent president’s party) is only held accountable for GDP growth in the specific situations of unified 
government, i.e., when the president and the prime minister belong to the same party. 
they endorse). In order to test this hypothesis, we regress Government Gain on Economy, 
the percent real GDP growth.17
Another explanation of electoral change across different types of elections 
consists in a simple “presidential penalty” (or, in our case, “governmental penalty”) 
hypothesis: the notion that electorates tend penalize the party controlling the executive 
independently of the quality of governmental performance (Erikson, 1988). There are, 
however, different reasons why this penalty should be effected. Proponents of a “negative 
voting” hypothesis suggest that, because “negative stimuli are more instrumental to vote 
choice than positive”, the evaluation of incumbents in midterm elections suffers from a 
negativity bias, through which “citizens displeased with a president’s performance are 
more likely to vote against his party’s congressional candidates than are satisfied voters 
likely to vote for them”, with the result that incumbent losses are always more likely than 
gains (Kernell, 1977: 52; see also Lau, 1985; and Fiorina and Shepsle, 1989).  
This hypothesis has already been tested outside the context of US midterm 
legislative elections. In a study of legislative elections held in ten presidential regimes, 
Shugart shows that, ceteris paribus, “over time, more voters become disillusioned and 
defect to the opposition”, with the result that “elections held early after a presidential 
election are likely to produce a surge in support for the new president, with a simple 
linear model fitting the data and predicting a decline over time in elections held later in 
the term” (Shugart, 1995: 337). We can readily adapt this hypothesis to the context of 
                                                 
17 If the presidential election was held until the end of June, we use percent GDP growth at year t-1 and, if 
after June, GDP growth at year t (presidential election year). Source for GDP growth data since 1960 was 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Online (http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/). Before 
1960, the source was Maddison (2003). 
presidential elections in semi-presidential systems. If the relative performance of 
government parties is to be affected by a general negativity bias, we should observe that, 
in comparison with the score obtained in the elections on the basis of which executive 
power is formed (legislative elections, in the case of semi-presidential systems), 
government parties’ performance in presidential elections should decline with the passage 
of time: keeping other things equal, the more time has passed since the legislative 
elections, the greater the punishment effected. We test this hypothesis by regressing 
Government Gain on Years, the time elapsed since the legislative elections took place 
(with the expectation of decreasing gains as more time elapses). 
Penalties for the parties controlling the executive, however, can derive from a 
rather different source. “Balancing theories” also predict government losses in elections 
for non-executive offices, but do so on the basis of rather different assumptions about the 
behaviour of voters. They assume that ideologically moderate voters who care about 
policy outcomes should have a preference for split partisan control of the presidency and 
Congress, i.e, for creating a balance of power between the executive and the legislature, 
and, thus, promoting policy outcomes that are compromises between the positions of the 
different parties controlling each branch (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989; Fiorina, 1992; 
Scheve and Tomz, 1999).  
We adapt this hypothesis to presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes by 
ascertaining whether gains of losses by the government’s parties in those elections are 
affected by whether government and the legislature are controlled by a single-party 
majority. As Shugart remarks, “the argument in favour of moderation between two 
relatively extreme parties appears to work only in systems in which majorities for one or 
another party are regularly expected” (Shugart, 1995: 329). But unlike what occurs in the 
U.S., where elections for the executive office result in its control by a clearly identifiable 
partisan incumbent, such majorities cannot be regularly expected as a result of legislative 
elections in parliamentary or semi-presidential systems, which also produce regularly 
alternative solutions, ranging from minority cabinets to those supported by oversized 
coalitions. Therefore, “balancing behavior” can be expected mostly when there is 
something like an “incumbent party”, which has the command over executive power that 
is only provided by the support of an absolute majority in parliament. In other words, the 
incentives for balancing between legislative and presidential elections in semi-
presidentialism should assume executives supported by cohesive single-party majorities. 
Thus, we expect governments to experience greater losses in presidential elections 
whenever they are supported by a party commanding an absolute majority in parliament, 
and add a dummy variable for Absolute Single Party Majority. 
Finally, we add two control variables. The first measures whether any of the 
candidates endorsed by parties in government is herself the incumbent president — 
Incumbent Government Candidate, 1 if yes, 0 if no — in order to take into account great 
and well-known advantages in terms of garnering votes and even dissuading otherwise 
viable competitors (Jones, 1999; Samuels, 2004). The second is Government Parties’ 
Vote in Legislative Elections, in order to control for a “regression to the mean” effect.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 shows the results of a multivariate test of the previously advanced 
hypotheses. First, contrary to what occurred in the analysis made in the previous section 
— where theories assuming the lower salience of presidential elections were tested — the 
new model produces a better fit to the results for the set of semi-presidential democracies 
with stronger (rather than weaker) presidencies. Second, within this small sub-sample of 
presidential election results, all variables have the predicted sign: positive for Economy 
and Incumbent Government Candidate, and negative for Years since Legislative Election, 
Absolute Single-Party Majority and Government’s Vote in Legislative Elections. 
However, not all explanations of the relative performance of government-
endorsed candidates perform equally well. Although both the coefficients on Incumbent 
Government Candidate and Economy fail to reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance, the former is much closer to that than the latter (p=.11). In other words, 
among the variables in the model, economic growth is the one that clearly does not 
produce relevant effects on government gains. Furthermore, besides the “regression to the 
mean effect” that we had already detected, two clearly significant trends emerge: a 
downward trend over time in the gains obtained by government parties in presidential 
elections, and a tendency for presidential candidates supported by parties enjoying single-
party majorities in parliament to experience losses. In other words, these results constitute 
supportive evidence for a “governmental penalty” hypothesis among semi-presidential 
regimes with stronger presidents, a penalty that results both from an accumulation of 
negative perceptions about government performance over time and from voters’ reaction 
to the potential concentration of the presidency, government and the legislature under 
control of a single-party. 
4. Discussion 
What kind of elections are presidential elections in semi-presidential 
democracies? The answers provided here to this question are inevitably tentative, the 
result of a first preliminary comparative exploration of aggregate electoral results in this 
type of political system. However, several conclusions can be advanced on the basis of 
the available data. 
First, our results confirm that theories elaborated in the context of the US midterm 
or European parliament elections can be successfully applied to other contexts, in order to 
account for the same sort of phenomenon: changes from general elections to other types 
of elections. Crucial for this endeavour of generalization, however, seems to be proper 
attention to contextual and systemic variations. As our results show, the success of 
different theoretical approaches in accounting for such changes from legislative to 
presidential elections in semi-presidential democracies seems to be contingent upon 
variables such as the actual powers bestowed upon the presidency and whether countries 
are early or late democratizers. Particularly crucial in differentiating the applicable 
theoretical approaches seems to be the extent to which presidents hold relevant powers in 
what concerns appointing and dismissing government officials and other office-holders, 
calling new elections, or influence decision-making in important policy domains.  
Theoretical approaches that assume the low salience of presidential elections tend, 
unsurprisingly, to fare better where presidential powers are more limited: lower levels of 
turnout in comparison with legislative elections are clearly more common where the 
presidency holds less powers, and the expected government losses at the middle of the 
first-order cycle seem to occur in these cases, at least, in “third wave” semi-presidential 
democracies. Conversely, theoretical approaches where the assumptions of lower salience 
are not crucial tend to be better in explaining electoral change in countries where 
presidents indeed hold more considerable powers. In these cases, presidential elections 
tend to elicit higher levels of turnout, and the ability of government parties and coalitions 
to translate their previous support in legislative elections into support for their 
presidential candidates is affected by a “governmental penalty”. On the one hand, in 
regimes with stronger presidencies, support for government-endorsed candidates displays 
a linear decline as we progress along the first-order cycle: with the values of the 
remaining variables set at their mean values, the model predicts a gain of 5.4 percentage 
points for government candidates when presidential elections take place in the month 
after the legislative elections, but a loss of 9.6 percentage points after four years have 
elapsed. On the other hand, voters seem to be less inclined to support a presidential 
candidate endorsed by a party that already enjoys full control of cabinet and parliament. 
The results supporting the “balancing hypothesis” are particularly interesting, since 
previous research had found difficulties in garnering evidence about this sort of 
behaviour outside the United States, either in presidential (Shugart, 1995) or 
parliamentary and semi-presidential systems (Elgie, 2001). In any case, however, the 
universe of semi-presidential regimes seems to be too diverse for a definition of “semi-
presidentialism” purely on the basis of “dispositional properties” (Elgie, 1998) to be 
politically consequential, at least in what concerns patterns of electoral change.  
The main negative finding of our analyses is also instructive. There is no evidence 
of the use by voters of presidential elections in semi-presidentialism as an opportunity to 
judge the government’s economic performance. It may be the case that the hypothesis 
that GDP growth should have an impact on government parties’ gains from legislative to 
presidential elections is in an excessive oversimplification of the way economic 
performance may to serve as a cue for voters in electoral contests to elect a president. 
However, this negative finding also has its rather plausible explanations. In fact, research 
on presidential elections in presidential systems had already revealed that, when those 
elections are not concurrent with legislative elections, economic performance produces 
no impact on the vote swing for the candidate of the president’s party, since non-
concurrence allows candidates to decouple the campaign from national policy issues and 
concentrates voters’ attentions on the personal qualities of candidates rather than 
government’s performance (Samuels, 2004).  
This is even more likely in semi-presidentialism, where the assignment of 
responsibilities for government performance to presidents is potentially much less clear 
than in presidentialism. It is true that, in the case of France, votes for or against the 
government-endorsed candidates in presidential elections do seem to serve as 
opportunities to pass judgement either on those who have been the de facto all-powerful 
heads of the executive (following unified government) or on those who aspire to become 
such figures (following cohabitation). However, as Duverger himself noted in his seminal 
article about semi-presidentialism, France, with its “supreme heads of the executive and 
real heads of the government” (at least under unified government), stands as an aberrant 
case of a president who “exercises in practice much stronger powers than his 
counterparts”, in comparison with other semi-presidential regimes where, in spite of 
significant constitutional powers, presidents and governments coexist in a shifting but 
still relatively balanced dualism (Duverger, 1980: 180). Thus, the lack of effects of 
economic performance on the government’s electoral performance in presidential 
elections, even among the set of semi-presidential democracies with the most powerful 
presidents, is also suggestive of the dangers of making generalizations about semi-
presidentialism on the basis of the highly exceptional French experience. 
These results also have implications for the prospects of cohabitation in semi-
presidential democracies. In both semi-presidential and presidential regimes (Shugart, 
1995: 315), unified government has been the almost invariable result of concurrent 
elections.18 However, at least within semi-presidential regimes with stronger presidents, 
there seems to exist a tendency towards the rejection of a particular kind of unified 
government. Note that this does not mean that voters are, in general, particularly reluctant 
to vote for presidential candidates endorsed by a party coalition in government. In fact, 
when those candidates are themselves the incumbents, voters tend to reward rather than 
punish them. And recent studies using individual-level data suggest that, although voters 
do engage in electorally consequential considerations about what kind of partisan 
                                                 
18 This was the case with the November 1996 and 2000 elections in Romania (the former resulting in 
victories for the Democratic Convention of Romania and for its presidential candidate, Emil 
Constantinescu, and the latter resulting in victories for the Social Democratic Party and Ion Iliescu), the 
Taiwanese 1996 elections (with the Kuomintang and Lee Teng-hui emerging as, respectively, the most 
voted party and candidate), the Peruvian 1980 and 1985 elections (with the triumph of Popular Action and 
Belaúnde Terry in the former, and of APRA and García Perez in the latter). Similarly, in the Romanian 
2004 elections, Adrien Nastase (supported by the Social Democratic and Humanist parties) emerged as the 
most voted candidate in the first round, while the coalition supporting him also topped the list of parties in 
the legislative elections. Curiously, although Nastase ultimately lost the second-round of the presidential 
elections to the Traian Basescu, who was endorsed by the ‘Justice and Truth’ Alliance (DA), this did not 
lead to divided government, since the coalition formed in December of 2004 was ultimately led by DA. In 
fact, the only case of concurrent elections in semi-presidential democracies not leading to unified 
government is the 1992 Slovenian case, where the victory of the Liberal Democratic Party in the legislative 
elections was accompanied by the landslide triumph of Milan Kucan, who anyway ran as an independent 
candidate. 
distribution of political offices they prefer, those considerations may be neither 
determined by a wish to promote policy moderation nor necessarily in favour of 
cohabitation. As Gschwend and Leuffen (2005) show in their study of the French 2002 
legislative elections, although voters who were less anchored in partisan and ideological 
terms did vote on the basis of their “regime preferences” — preferences for premier-
presidential cohabitation or compatibility — a large (and, throughout the campaign, 
increasing) part of those voters actually preferred the latter. However, our results point to 
the need to investigate voters’ reactions to the prospect of a particular kind of unified 
government: where the assembly, the cabinet, and the presidency might fall under the 
control not of a coalition of parties, but of a single party. Under that prospect, our results 
suggest, government-endorsed candidates do tend to experience important losses. 
Finally, the election of weak presidents in semi-presidential regimes remains 
somewhat of a mystery in what concerns what those elections might really be about. 
When the partisan affiliation of the president is of little consequence to the composition 
of governments, the survival of legislatures, or policy-making agendas and outcomes, 
presidential elections could conceivably conform better to the second-order model in 
terms of their lack of salience and, thus, government punishment. And yet, at least in the 
older established democracies, they do not. We would like to suggest this may be a 
function of political learning under conditions of a stabilized and consolidated 
democracy. As the experience with the functioning of a semi-presidential regime with a 
largely ceremonial president accrues, the political conflictuality around her identity and 
role is likely to diminish, and politicians and voters’ perceptions of the exceptionally low 
stakes involved in the presidential election become stabilized. While voters might still be 
conceivably interested to take advantage of presidential elections as a signalling device, 
they may also find that their options have been dramatically narrowed by the way 
political supply has, meanwhile, been restructured by politicians, by the adoption of 
crosscutting appeals on the part of presidential candidates, their recruitment outside the 
party system, and the formation of large coalitions encompassing both government and 
opposition parties around particular candidates, especially if they are uncontroversial 
(because largely ceremonial and powerless) incumbent heads of state seeking re-election.  
In fact, presidential contests such as the already mentioned 1997 Irish elections 
(with no candidate having ever occupied a high party office and only one of them a 
practicing politician at all), the 1998 elections in Iceland (with Vigdís Finnbogadóttir 
receiving the tacit support of almost all parties and a staggering 94.6 percent of the vote 
when challenged by a single candidate of the Humanist Party), or the Austrian 1980 
elections (with the SPÖ in government and the main party in the opposition — ÖVP — 
joining to endorse the uncontroversial re-election of Rudolf Kirchschläger) seem to be far 
more common in the established (weak) semi-presidential regimes then those in the 
recently consolidated democracies. Thus, either because the links between presidential 
candidates and the party system are made more diffuse or because grand coalitions 
around presidential candidates muddle the options of those who wish to express 
discontent with government performance, government punishment may have become 
more difficult to express for voters in presidential elections in the established semi-
presidential democracies. These cases tend to become, then, a sort of “third-order” 
elections, where voters are left with little else to judge than the personal qualities of 
candidates or, at most, their positions on a multiplicity of issues with different salience 
for different voters (van der Brug et al., 2000: 646-647).  
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Table 1 
Presidential and legislative elections in semi-presidential democracies (1945-2005) 
 Legislative elections Presidential elections 
Countries First-last (N) Average turnout 
(%) 
First-last (N) Average-turnout 
(%) 
Austria (1945-) 1946-2002 (18) 90.7 1951-2004 (11) 89.1 
 
Bulgaria (1991-) 1991-2005 (5) 68.1 1992-2001 (3) 60.0 
 
Cape Verde (1992-) 1995-2001 (2) 63.7 2001 (1) 51.6 
 
Croatia (2000-) 2000-2003 (2) 69.2 2000-2005 (2) 55.8 
 
Finland (1945-) 1945-2003 (17) 75.6 1950-2000 (9) 74.0 
 
France (1962-) 1962-2002 (11) 72.7 1965-2002 (7) 80.6 
 
Iceland (1945-) 1946-2002 (17) 89.3 1952-2004 (6) 81.0 
 
Ireland (1945-) 1944-2002 (17) 72.6 1945-1997 (6) 57.1 
 
Lithuania (1992-) 1992-2004 (4) 58.2 1993-2004 (4) 63.0 
 
Mali (1992-) 2002 (1) 26.0 2002 (1) 38.6 
 
Mongolia (1992-) 1992-2004 (4) 87.2 1993-2005 (4) 83.7 
 
Peru (1979-1992) 1980-1985 (2) 80.5 1980-1985 (2) 86.5 
 
Poland (1992-) 1993-2005 (4) 46.7 1995-2005 (3) 59.7 
 
Portugal (1976-) 1976-2005 (11) 73.2 1976-2001 (6) 68.9 
 
Romania (1996-) 1996-2004 (3) 66.6 1996-2004 (3) 66.6 
 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
(1990-) 
1991-2002 (4) 65.0 1996-2001 (2) 74.0 
 
Slovakia (1999-) 2002 (1) 70.1 1999-2004 (2) 60.9 
 
Slovenia (1991-) 1992-2004 (4) 72.7 1992-2002 (3) 75.6 
 
Taiwan (1994-) 1996-2004 (4) 67.4 1996-2004 (3) 79.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Average difference between turnout in presidential and legislative elections 
-15.5
-13.4
-12.1
-9.2 -8.3 -8.1
-4.3 -3.5
-1.6 -1.6
0.0
2.9
4.8
6.0
7.9 9.0
12.3 12.6 13.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
-20.0
Ire
lan
d (
19
45
-)
Cr
oa
tia
 (2
00
0-)
Ca
pe
 V
erd
e (
19
92
-)
Slo
va
kia
 (1
99
9-)
Ice
lan
d (
19
45
-)
Bu
lga
ria
 (1
99
1-)
Po
rtu
ga
l (1
97
6-)
Mo
ng
oli
a (
19
92
-)
Au
str
ia 
(19
45
-)
Fin
lan
d (
19
45
-)
Ro
ma
nia
 (1
99
6-)
Slo
ve
nia
 (1
99
1-)
Lit
hu
an
ia 
(19
92
-)
Pe
ru 
(19
79
-19
92
)
Fra
nc
e (
19
62
-)
Sã
o T
om
é a
nd
 Pr
ínc
ipe
 (1
99
0-)
Ta
iw
an
 (1
99
4-)
Ma
li (
19
92
-)
Po
lan
d (
19
92
-)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Power of popularly elected presidents in semi-presidential democracies 
Non-presidential democratic 
regimes with direct presidential 
elections 
Chair 
cabinet 
meetings 
Veto Broad 
emergency 
and decree 
powers 
Central 
role in 
foreign 
policy 
Discretionary 
appointment 
powers 
Central role 
in forming 
government 
Power to 
dissolve 
parliament 
Presidential 
Powers 
Index 
 
São Tomé and Príncipe (1990-) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
France (1958-) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Mali (1992-) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Peru (1979-1992) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Cape Verde (1992-) 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Finland (1956-1994) 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Portugal (1976-1982) 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Finland (1945-1956) 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 4 
Finland (1994-2000) 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 4 
Poland (1992-1997) 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 4 
Taiwan (1994-) 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 
Croatia (2000-) 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
Lithuania (1992-) 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Mongolia (1992-) 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Romania (1996-) 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Bulgaria (1991-) 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Ireland (1945-) 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Poland (1997-) 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Portugal (1982-) 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Finland (2000-) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Slovakia (1999-) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Austria (1945-) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iceland (1945-) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia (1991-) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 3 
The impact of presidential powers in presidential-legislative turnout difference (OLS 
estimates) 
 Full sample 
(Model 1) 
Excluding concurrent elections  
(Model 2) 
Constant 4.67 
(8.58) 
5.11 
(9.25) 
Presidential powers index 1.57*** 
(.58) 
1.44** 
(.65) 
Incumbent running -1.08 
(2.27) 
-1.51 
(2.49) 
Years since legislative election 1.27 
(1.08) 
1.96 
(1.25) 
Turnout in preceding legislative election -.16 
(.10) 
-.18 
(.11) 
R2
F ratio 
N 
.22 
4.71*** 
74 
.23 
4.59*** 
67 
* p < 0.10;  ** p < 0.05;  *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Average government gains in presidential elections 
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Table 4 
Government gains in presidential elections: regression to the mean, surge and decline, 
and second-order cyclical effects (OLS estimates) 
 Full sample 
 
Presidential powers 
index<4 
Presidential powers 
index>3 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 3.35 
(6.84) 
7.17 
(7.22) 
1.20 
(8.93) 
9.08 
(9.10) 
11.54 
(13.38) 
.12 
(14.02) 
Government Parties’ Vote in Legislative 
Elections 
-.11 
(.10) 
-.19* 
(.10) 
-.02 
(.13) 
-.12 
(-.13) 
-.36 
(.23) 
-.21 
(.22) 
Turnout change .03 
(.17) 
.07 
(.16) 
-.16 
(.26) 
-.19 
(.24) 
-.12 
(.36) 
.24 
(.36) 
Cycle 6.67 
(22.24) 
 -22.46 
(31.28) 
 45.44 
(30.61) 
 
Cycle2 -15.06 
(22.24) 
 14.70 
(31.82) 
 -54.56 
(29.28) 
 
First and second waves  5.93 
(9.29) 
 -7.81 
(13.69) 
 20.42 
(14.39) 
First and second waves *Cycle  6.20 
(38.04) 
 35.69 
(68.17) 
 -18.73 
(51.19) 
Third wave*Cycle  -30.10 
(26.52) 
 -.78.89** 
(36.35) 
 31.92 
(39.25) 
First and second waves *Cycle2  -14.57 
(38.63) 
 -43.31 
(81.50) 
 4.57 
(46.32) 
Third wave * Cycle2  19.38 
(26.26) 
 68.25* 
(35.39) 
 -53.10 
(38.87) 
R2
F ratio 
N 
.04 
.69 
68 
.22 
2.41** 
68 
.04 
.39 
43 
.25 
1.63 
43 
.27 
1.82 
25 
.51 
2.52* 
25 
* p < 0.10;  ** p < 0.05;  *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5  
Economic voting, negative voting and balancing in presidential elections in semi-
presidential systems (OLS estimates) 
 Full sample 
 
(Model 1) 
Presidential powers 
index<4 
(Model 2) 
Presidential powers 
index>3 
(Model 3) 
Constant 
 
5.43 
(6.34) 
-.46 
(8.30) 
23.88* 
(12.79) 
Economy 
 
-.03 
(.37) 
-.15 
(.48) 
.22 
(1.05) 
Years since Legislative Election 
 
-1.78 
(1.49) 
-1.56 
(2.40) 
-3.83* 
(1.86) 
Absolute Single-Party Majority 
 
-4.01 
(4.77) 
-1.86 
(6.93) 
-13.12* 
(7.53) 
Incumbent Government Candidate  
 
6.84* 
(3.75) 
4.84 
(5.38) 
8.74 
(5.25) 
Government Parties’ Vote in 
Legislative Elections 
-.14 
(.10) 
-.04 
(.14) 
-.39** 
(.18) 
R2
F ratio 
N 
.09 
1.28 
68 
.04 
.34 
43 
.42 
2.70* 
25 
* p < 0.10;  ** p < 0.05;  *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
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